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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\VILLIAM G. GIBBS and 1 
MARY GIBBS, 
Plaintiffs a1ld Appellants 
-vs.-
DON L. BUEHNER, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents 
F'IRST WESTERN FIDELITY, 
et al., 
Cross Claimants and Respondents 
-vs.-
WILLIAM G. GIBBS, et al., 
Third Party Defendamts and 
and Appella;nts 
Case 
No.10706 
BRIEF OF AP·PELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is really a suit to determine which of the two 
groups of parties has been cheated by one Charles L. 
\Vall (herein called "Wall"), erstwhile president of 
Guaranty Trust Deed Company, whose company is in 
hankruptcy and who is, himself, now appealing from 
eonviction of federal securities acts violations. The group 
wl1ieh has not been cheated will have the land with ref-
1 
erence to which hoth groups dealt. The other has an 
action against \Vall if they care to file it. 
In essence, we have a quiet title action. The land 
in controversy is 61 acres (herein called the "Tract") 
in Davis County. In 1962, appellants entered into con-
tracts ~with Wall under which appellants conveyed the 
Tract to a trustee from whom Wall would have become 
entitled to conveyance of the Tract upon satisfying cer-
tain conditions. Appellants claim the conditions were 
never satisfied. They obtained a default judgment 
against Wall rescinding the sales contract before the 
trustee conveyed legal title to vVall or anyone claiming 
under him. They contend their title was thereby fully 
restored subject only to the mortgage obligation set forth 
in that judgment. 
Respondents have a variety of claims arising out of 
transactions with vVall after he contracted to buy the 
Tract and before the rescision of the sales contract. All 
the other respondents must stand or fall with respond-
ent First vVestern Fidelity (herein called "Fidelity"), 
and, for the sake of brevity, we \Vill concern ourselves 
only with Fidelity's claims. 
Fidelity contracted to purchase the Tract from vVall 
while his contract with appellants was still in effect. It 
claims one or more of the following propositions are true: 
(1) That ~Wall suhRtnntially performed his contract with 
appellants so that appellants must now perform and give 
clear titlt> to Fidclit)- aR 1rnrchasl•r from \Val1, or (2) that 
appellants, if thPy did not in faet receive the purchase 
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price for which they contracted, are estopped to deny it, 
or (:)) that Fidelity has, by deeds already delivered to it, 
acquired legal title to the Tract as a bona fide purchaser 
for ndue without notice of any fraud Wall may have per-
rwtrated in obtaining whatever interest he had. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On .June 27, 1962, appellants unquestionably owned 
the Tract (Record p. 128). On that date, they entered 
into au agreement (Exh. 5) with Wall which contemplat-
ell exchange of the Tract (valued at $183,000.00) for 
properties of the same value to be identified, appraised 
arnl accepted within thirty days. Pursuant to that agree-
ment, appellants conveyed the Tract to Security Title 
Company (herein called "Security") as trustee. Wall 
did not produce properties within the thirty days, so the 
parties made a supplemental agreement (Exh. 6) on 
September 5, 1962. It provided, inter alia, that Wall 
could take title to the Tract (i.e. obligate appellants to 
instruct Security to convey it to Wall) by depositing 
with a trustee securities having a value at least 21/2 times 
the unpaid balance of the purchase price. 
To implement their agreement, Wall and appellants 
entered into an escrow agreement with Security (Exhs. 
3 and 4). Security was instructed to convey the Tract 
to vVall when certain conditions had been satisfied. Se-
curity never did convey legal title to Wall or anyone 
elsP (Transcript p. 360). On October 3, 1962, Security 
executed and delivered to B. J. Investment Company an 
irn.;trnment in the form of a warranty deed to the Tract 
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( Exh. :20), but that instrnnwnt has been judiciall>- deter-
mined to ha\'e com·eyed a security interest only 
(Exh. 26). 
\Vall purported to deposit securities with the 
trustee. He did so hy com'eying to Security a property 
identified as the Pueblo Motel. To induce appellants to 
believe he had satisfied the conditions ·which wonhl 
justify Security's co1IYcying the Tract to Wall or his 
nominee, Wall made some representations about the 
Pueblo J\fotel (Exhibit 21, Transcript 170-74) which were 
untrue, which he knew to be untrue, and on which appel-
lants placed some reliance. These representatious will 
later be diRcussed in some detail. 
Before Serurity in fact parted with legal title, ap-
pellants discovered the falsity of Wall's representations. 
They then sued to rescind their contract with ·wall, and, 
on November 10, 1964, obtained a judgment (Exh. 21) de-
claring the contract to be rescinded and their title to 
the 61 acres to he restored subject to an encumbrance 
in the amount of $43,600.00 in favor of Fidelity, which 
had paid the B. .J. Investmenh; Company mortgage and 
suecceclecl to the mortgagee's interest. 
So far as Fidelity is concerned, the record reveals 
that it contracte(l with Wall to purchase the Tract on Sep-
tember 10, 1962 (Exh. 9) when Wall had an equitable 
interest. Thereafter, :B1 idelity quitclaimed the Tract to 
Security on October 3, 1062 (Exh. 16), took a warranty 
deed from ·wall on October 4, HJ62 (Exh. 18) and took 
a special warranty deed from R. .J. Investments Com-
4 
pany on Nonmber 24, 1964, (Exh. 20) after notice of 
appellants' suit against Wall and filing of lis pendens 
(R<•co1·cl, p. 131; Transcript, p. 87). None of these trans-
adio11s eoukl have vested legal title in Fidelity because 
none of its grantors held it. 
·with referenee to estoppel, the record reveals these 
facts, all established by Fidelity's own evidence: 
Fidelity was aware as early as September 27, 1962, 
that S<>curity held title to the Tract under an agreement 
whi0h would justify conveyance to Wall only if certain 
eomlitions ·were met (Transcript, p. 278). Fidelity was 
Jwvertheless "relying" on the representations of Mr. 
Ra.v1 and Mr. Sorenson that Wall would immediately 
satisfy the conditions and that title would be "forth-
coming" (Transcript, p. 275). To assure itself that 
\Vall C'onld in fact deliver marketable title to the Tract, 
J1-,idelit3' did not demand that Wall produce or record a 
<leed from Security. Instead, Fidelity relied on a state-
ment hy appellant William Gibbs, made on September 27, 
1962, that "Charlie and I have about settled our dif-
fiC'nlties and are about ready to close" (Transcript p. 
278) and on a note left for Mr. Kump, Fidelity's counsel, 
by one Patsy Mortenson on October 4, 1962. Mr. Kump 
testified that Patsy wrote that Mr. Gibbs said, "Got 
(~J1arles Wall matter approved and confirmed last night, 
keep smiling." (Record, p. 282.) On October 2, during 
a tPlephone conversation, Mr. Gibbs told Mr. Kump that 
tlw transaction with Wall "was just about ready to be 
eomplei rd hut had not yet been completed" (Record, p. 
281). 
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'With reference to the degree of Wall's satisfaction 
of the conditions which alone would have entitled him 
to a conveyance of the 'l'ract, we have only the testimony 
of Mr. Gibbs and Wall. Both testified that the Pueblo 
Motel, encumbered as it was when Wall conveyed it to 
Security, had no value in excess of its mortgage, and that 
Wall deliberately misrepresented its value in an effort 
fraudulently to obtain a deed. Fidelity adduced no evi-
dence that the transfer of the Pueblo Motel satisfied 
the security requirements of the Gibbs-\¥ all contract or 
that it had any value. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The trial court concluded that Fidelity was entitled 
to a conveyance of the Tract free from any claim of ap-
pellants and entered its decree accordingly. Appellants 
are unable to determine on what theory the court pro-
ceeded. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
A ppellauts seek an order of this Court annulling the 
judgment and decree herein, for the reason that the con-
clusions are against tbe lmv and the findings against the 
evidence, and declaring appellants to be the owners of 
the Tract subject to the rights of Fidelity as mortgagee. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING 
CERTAIN FINDINGS WHICH ARE BASED 
SOLELY ON THE COURT'S DETERMINA-
TION NOT TO BELIEVE THE -WITNESSES. 
'rhe trial court adopted 45 findings of fact in this 
c·aRe. Collectively, they give little indication of the 
court's theory, and appellants are uncertain \Yhether 
tlw court is persuaded (1) that Wall performed his 
agreement with appellants so that he, or his assignee, is 
no-w entitled to appellants' performance, or (2) that 
appellants are estopped to deny Wall's performance, or 
(3) that Fidelity has somehow acquired legal title, by in-
struments already delivered to it, as a bona fide pur-
chasPr. 
In any event, the court made certain findings against 
appellants even though not just a preponderance but aU 
of the> e\·idence is to the contrary. We will state the find-
ing8 \\·e believe to be in this category separately and com-
ment on the evidence under each such finding. 
FINDING NO. 13 
"Wall represented that the Glendale property 
- the Pueblo Motel - had su,bstantial value. 
Plaintiff William Gibbs did not rely on Wall's 
re JJrpsentations to a. material extent, but relied 
on appraisals by other persons and on information 
obtained from telephone calls to building amd loam 
offi.cers, and their opinions of value and income, 
7 
and was motivated primarily by the f arnily dis-
uni:ty and urgent need to dispose of the 61.23 
acres.'' 
l\fr. Gibbs is, of course, the only witness compe-
tent to testify as to the representations on which he relied 
in making decisions with reference to the Tract. He tes-
ified (transcript, pp. 69-75) that Wall (then associated 
with the L.D.S. Church and president of an apparently 
legitimate business with advertised assets in the mil-
lions) came to him in September of 1962 and proposed 
to transfer to a trustee, as the security which would jus-
tify immediate conveyance of the Tract to him under 
Exhibit 6, the Pueblo Motel. He then made reference 
to an appraisal of the property ·which valued it suffi-
ciently above its mortgage to qualify it as security. To 
corroborate his story, he called accomplices in Califor-
nia who talked with Gibbs. Every utterance or writing 
on which Gibbs could possibly have relied, however, ema-
nated from or was solicited by Wall. No one but Wall 
represented that the appraisals were reliable and that 
the value had not changed. It was the total presenta-
tion by ·wan, although cleverly corroborated, which was 
false, known by Wall to he false, made to induce a re-
sponse, and relied upon at least to the extent that ap-
pellants permitted the Tract to be mortgaged. vVe sub-
mit that all the information Gibbs received on the day 
of Wall's presentation was communicated to Gibbs by 
or through Wall and is part and parcel of Wall's mis-
representation. 
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FINDING NO. 14 
"The Piieblo Motel is in Eagle Rock, which ad-
joins Glendale, which fact was not shown to be a 
materia,z representation or unknown to Mr. Gibbs 
at the time of the agreement." 
Gibbs testified (transcript, p. 70) that Wall said the 
Pueblo Motel was in Glendale, that he (Gibbs) believed 
it and had no information to the contrary, and that Eagle 
Roek is "quite a different area" from Glendale (p. 77). 
There is no evidence that Gibbs knew the property was 
actually in Eagle Rock. There is no evidence that Eagle 
Rock and Glendale are equivalent business environments. 
Section 558 of the Restatement of Torts says "a fact is 
material if its existence or non-existence is a matter to 
which a reasonable man would attach importance in de-
termining his choice of action in the transaction in ques-
tion.'' The location of a business property is certainly a 
factor to be considered by a reasonable man in determin-
i11g \vhether or not to acquire it. 
FINDING NO. 15 
''The Pueblo Motel was not timely rejected 
b1J the William Gibbs group, which attempted to 
h~ld that property and still have the opportunity 
of bettering their position over other creditors 
of Wall and gi1,e them an advantage in this action 
o~:er the other creditors of Wall." 
The evidence is uncontradicted that the Pueblo Mo-
tel was transferred to Security only to secure Wall's ob-
ligations to make eventual payment of the purchase price 
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for the Tract. This \Vas Gibb's testimony ( '11 ranscript 
p. Gi1) Gun's testimony (Transcript p. 372) and ·wall's 
testimony (Transcript of .July 5 hearing, p. 43). Gibbs 
was under no contractual obligation to reject \drntever 
security was offered. It was merely true that, if accept-
ahle secmity was deposited with the trustee, ·wan would 
become entitled under the September 5 contract (Exhibit 
6) to a conveyance from the trustee. Whether or not the 
Pueblo Motel was temporarily considered to be accept-
able security is unimportant. It was discovered to he 
valueless before Security conveyed the Tract, and any 
right to conveyance Wall might have claimed was ad-
judged to have terminated. 
There is no shred of evidence that appellants at-
tempted to hold the property to gain an unconscionable 
advantage over other creditors of Wall. As a matter of 
fact, appellants never held it at all. Appellants took 
no action ·with reference to the Pueblo Motel. They 
were not accepting it as an exchange property, and the 
trustee, in Mr. Gurr's words, understood "that it was 
just given as security, and Mr. Wall should keep it be-
cause he expected to get it hack.'' 
A reasonable construction of the Exhibit 6 Agree-
ment (i.e. the provision that Buyer reserves the right to 
withdraw posted securities) is that Wall could at any 
time have withdrawn the Pueblo Motel, had he wished, 
so long as the Tract remained intact and unencumbered 
with the trustee. 
Finally, the evider1ce is that the Pueblo Motel was 
acquired by mortgage foreclosure in April of 1964 for the 
10 
amount of the first mortgage against it (Transcript p. 
78). Appellants enjoyed no advantage over the ·wan 
creditors by virtue of Wall's having conveyed this worth-
10ss el1uity to Security. Even if they had enjoyed an 
aclvantage, however, it was exactly what they bargained 
for. 
We would challenge respondents to produce from 
this record a document which imposed a contractual 
llnty upon appellants to reject the Pueblo Motel as se-
curity or to take any action they failed to take. 
FINDING NO. 16 
"The holding of said property by the William 
Gibbs group has not been in good faith." 
This is typical of the amorphous and unanswerable 
findings made by the trial court in this proceeding. The 
eourt finds appellants acted in "bad faith" and do not 
have ''clean hands.'' This is a quiet title action, essen--
t ially, and hardly a proceeding in equity. If a "clean 
hands'' doctrine has application, however, the court 
should specify the conduct of the stigmatized party which 
is reprehensible. 
There is no evidence that appellants violated any 
contract with or failed in any duty toward respondents. 
They had no business relationship with respondents. 
The suggestion that appellants lost their virtue by per-
mitting Fidelity to rely on Patsy Mortenson's note is 
particularly ridiculous. Fidelity took a warranty deed 
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to the Tract from \Vall on October 4, 1962. Fidelity 
didn't have to rely and could not, in the exercise of 
reasonable business judgment, have relied Oll Patsy. 
Bt>fore Fidelity proceeded with its transactions, it should 
have demanded a conveyance from Security. Certainly, 
this would have bet>n the businesslike way to assure that 
Wall had safodied the Gibbs-Wall contract conditions. 
The obvious reason Fidelity didn't make such demand is 
that Fidelity knew the conditions for conveyance had not 
been met. 
FINDING NO. 18 
''Plaintiffs have failed to prove their damage 
as to the Piwblo Motel by its not having the full 
value represented by Wall and have failed to show 
that they have suffered arny damage by reliance on 
Wall's representations as to the Pueblo Motel." 
Appellants have, if the trial court's decision is up-
held, lost $65,000.00, the unpaid portion of the purchase 
price on which they and Wall agreed. They have lost it 
because they relied on Wall's representations as to the 
value of the Pueblo Motel. Except for that reliance, ap-
pellants would not have done whatever it is that, in the 
view of the trial court, has soiled their hands. 
FINDING NO. 20 
''The Eagle Rock property at one time appears 
to have had the value represented by Wall. A 
chainge of freeway made the location less desir-
able and the property less valuable. Whether Mr. 
Wall knew of the change or that the property had 
become less valuable, or the extent of the loss of 
value of the property was not shown." 
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\Vall testified (Transcript of July 5 hearing, p. 44) 
and made an affidavit (Record p. 279) that he knew, when 
lw repesentcd to Gibbs that the Pueblo Motel was a 
t.:100,000.00 property, that a new freeway had been pro-
posed which would shunt most of the traffic away from 
Colorado Blvd., that the property was really worth little 
in excess of its mortgage and that the deterioration of 
the property and its environment had greatly decreased 
its value since the appraisals were made. Mr. Gibbs tes-
tified that Wall had made these admissions to him. We 
can conceive of no kind of evidence which would consti-
tute a "shov.'1ng" if these kinds will not. 
FINDING NO. 21 
''The failure of the plaintiffs to produce Mr. 
Wall as a witness when they had him under sub-
poena affects the credibility of plaintiffs' wit-
nesses, including the testimony of William Gibbs 
as to the state of mind and representations of Mr. 
Wall and as to their good faith and clean hoods." 
The Court's readiness to find bad faith and unclean 
harnfa - where appellants are concerned - is nowhere 
lwtter exemplified than in this finding. In the Court's 
view, a party loses all privilege to seek equity if he sub-
poenas a witness and then decides against calling him. 
A 11 the parties had the same opportunity to subpoena 
·wall. His prosecution in federal court was well puh-
lirized. ·while Wall may have expressed repentence, 
appe1lants had no control over his testimony and were 
obli0'0rl to reO'ard him as adverse. We have searched in 
·~ b 
\'ain for any authority for the proposition that a litigant 
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who subpoenas a witness must call him. There is i10 
precedPut or text support for the idea that a litigant dis-
qualifies himself for equitable relief by his failure to call 
a subpoenaed witness. 
FINDING NO. 27 
On or about that date First Western Fidelity 
was informed by TVilliarn G. Gibbs that the closing 
of the Gibbs transaction with Wall was assured, 
which statement was made after Gibbs was in-
formed that First Western would not authorize 
release of its property by Stanley Title Company 
until title to the 61.23 acres was assured." 
The evidence about Gibbs' "assurance" has already 
been revie-wed. On September 27, (assuming Fidelity's 
account is accurate) he said "Charlie and I have ahout 
settled our differences and are about to close." On Octo-
ber 2, Gibbs said the transaction with Wall "had not yet 
been completed." Beyond that, we have a note to Mr. 
Kump from Patsy Mortenson to the effect that the "Wall 
matter'' had been ''approved and confirmed.'' 
If Fidelity really believed that Patsy's cryptic note 
constituted an assurance that Wall could now demand 
the Tract from Security, it is hardly credible that Fidel-
ity would not have demanded the deed; Fidelity took a 
warrant~T deed from Wa1l on the very date of that note. 
Finding after finding was made without any foun-
dation in the evidence at all. To support the findings, 
the court merely categorized appellants as near per-
jurers (Record p. 263). The Court particularly so cat0-
14 
gorized Mr. Gibbs and Mr. :Marshall, both members of the 
liar and of good reputation whose testimony in this case 
was unimpeached. The Court did so on the sole basis that 
they have a financial interest in the outcome of the suit. 
It would indeed be shocking to learn that a court may dis-
regard or discredit the testimony of litigants just be-
cause they are litigants. The Court, on the other hand, 
eulogized Mr. Kump (who also has a financial interest in 
the outcome of the suit) even though Mr. Kump's testi-
mony is not essentially different from Mr. Gibbs' as to 
their communications. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE ELEMENTS OF FRAUD DID NOT 
EXIST IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
APPELLANTS AND WALL. 
At the outset, it should be noted that appellants had 
a judgment against \Vall when this suit began, and that 
judgment constituted a judicial pronouncement that Wall 
had perpetrated a fraud against appellants. As between 
appellants and Wall, the issues relating to fraud were res 
a<ljudicata. (See 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, Section 226.) 
The trial court, however, adopted specific conclu-
sions that the elements of fraud were absent in the Gibbs-
\Vall relationship. (Record, p. 308, Conclusion 5, 6, and 
7.) ~We believe the court requires little edification on 
the elements of fraud. They are (1) a representation, 
(2) its falsity, (3) its materiality, (4) the speaker's 
knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth, ( 5) his 
iutent that it should be acted on by the person and in the 
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manner reasonable contemplated, ( 6) the hearer's igno-
rance of its falsity, ( 7) his relianee on its truth, ( 8) his 
right to rely thereon, and (9) his consequent and proxi-
mate injury. (37 CJS, Fraud Par 3; Nielson v. LeamiJ1g-
ton Mines and Exploration Company, 48 Pac. 2d 439, 87 
Utah 69; Kinnear v. Proivs, 16 Pac. 2d 1094, 81Utah135; 
Guaranty Mortgage Comvany v. Fling, 240 Pac. 175, 66 
Utah 128, 23 Am .. Jur., Fraud and Deceit, Sec. 20; Re-
statement of Torts, Sections 526-549.) 
The evidence in this record as to the elements of 
fraud is voluminous. It consists of the following: 
A. Mr. Gibbs' Testimony that: 
1. Wall told him on September 22, 1962, that the 
Pueblo Motel had a value of $300,000.00, that 
revenues from its operation would capitalize at 
or above that figure and leave substantial excess 
after servicing- the mortgage debt of $129,000.00, 
that no depreciation or deterioration in value had 
occurred in the year or so since last appraisal. 
2. Subsequent investigation revealed that, at the 
time Wall made the statements, the Motel was 
not producing enough revenue to service its debt, 
the property vvas deteriorated, the highway on 
which it depended relocated, and the mortgage in 
default. 
3. ·wan admitted to him in 1964 that he, Wall, 
knew (from having just tried to refinance the Mo-
tel) that his 1962 statements were false when he 
made them and that he had all the facts then 
which Gihhs' later investigation revealed. 
4. He did not know of falsity of the Wall repre-
sentations. 
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3. He relied on Wall's r2presentations in deal-
ing ·with the Tract, i.e., permitting it to be mort-
gaged. 
6. Wall was, at the time he misrepresented the 
Pueblo Motel, associated with the business activi-
ties of the L. D. S. Church and president of an ap-
parently successful lending institution. 
B. Mr. Wall testified at the July 5 hearing, gave his 
affidavit (R. 277-9) and stipulated (Exh. 29) that: 
1. He told Gibbs in September of 1962 that the 
Pueblo Motel was worth $300,000.00 on the basis 
of its revenues and that the Motel was producing 
substantially in excess of the income necessary to 
service its debt. 
2. That he knew, when he made those statements, 
that they were false in that the highway was about 
to be relocated away from the property, he had 
just tried and failed to borrow additional money 
against the Motel, and the existing mortgage was 
in de fa ult. (Trans of July 5 Hearing, p. 33.) 
3. He was, when he made the misrepresentations, 
associated with the business offices of the L. D. S. 
Church and president of Guaranty Trust Deed 
Corporation. (Transcript of July 5 Hearing, p. 
17, 18.) 
C. The default judgment (Exh. 21) for appellants 
and against Wall on a complaint charging all the ele-
ments of fraud, that default being an admission of every 
material allegation of the complaint (Credit Men v. Bow-
man, 38 U. 326, 113 Pac. 63; Jensen v. Barrick, 15 U. 2d 
285, B!Jl P. 2d 429.) 
There is absolutely no evidence controverting any 
aspect of appellants' presentation with reference to 
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~Wall's fraud. VVP agree', of course, that the existence of 
two clements of fraud, the maieriality of the representn-
tio11s and the right of tlw r0cipient to rely on them, in-
volYe the application of principles of law. We \vill com-
ment on these legal principles separately: 
A. 
1\IATERIALITY OF WALL'S 
REPRESENTATIONS 
Wall said the property was in Glendale when it was 
actually in Eagle Rock; he said it produced income which 
woulU justify its appraisal at $300,000.00. Both of these 
statements \Vere false. \Vere they material~ 
The Restatement of rrorts, Section 538, says, ''a 
fact is material if its existence or non-existence is a mat-
ter to which a reasonable man would attach importance 
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in 
question." The value of the security, in this case, was 
the only concern of the sellers. If the value was there, 
they could he sure of payment if they permitted the Tract 
to he alienated. If the value was not there, they could 
not be sure. 
The editors of A.L.R. have reviewed the leading 
cases on thi8 subject and reached this conclusion: "It is 
held almost automatically and as a matter of law that the 
vast or prc'8ent r<'nts, profits, income or dividends of 
the subject matter of a rontract is material and that reD-
resentatimis ('OlH'erni11g these matters are material." (21 
ALR 2nd, 14.) 
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False statements as to the location of property will 
n lone justify rescission of a sales contract. "It is a well 
:c;ettlccl principle that false statements or misrepresenta-
tions as to the location of real property which is the sub-
.i<'rt matter of a transaction constitute actionable fraud." 
(23 Am .• Tur., Fraud & Deceit, Sec. 52.) 
B 
APPELLANTS' RIGHT TO RELY 
There was nothing about Wall's history or appear-
ance in 1952 which should have evoked appellants' dis-
trust. He purported to speak knowledgably about a 
husiness property as its owner. It was a property 750 
miles distant ·with which appellants were unfamiliar. 
Tlw view of the Restatement (Restatement of Torts, Sec . 
. )40) is that, ''the recipient in a business transaction of 
a fraudulent misrepresentation of facts is justified in 
relying on its truth, although he might have ascertained 
the falsity of the representation had he made an investi-
gation." The cases from every jurisdiction adopt the 
eoncept that, in our complex business ·world, a buyer has 
the right to rely on a seller's representations a bout a 
business property which is the subject of their transac-
tion. In 27 ALR 2d 14, the annotator's summarization on 
this point is this: 
''The representee has a right to rely upon a posi-
tive statement concerning the past or present 
rents, profits or income, and need not conduct ~n 
investigation to learn whether the statement is 
trne or false .... It should also be noted that the 
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average businessman or lawyer is not able to 
make such an examiHation of the books of a busi-
ness as would reveal the falsity of statements as 
to profits of the business where it is of some size 
arnl iu ~rnd1 eal-'e he is entitled to rely on the 
sell('r's representations.'' 
The suggestion that ·wall's false statement8 can lw 
dismissed as mere puffery is particularly out of harmo11y 
with the authorities. Statements about the le"'l'el of busi-
ness income are simply not in that category. Nor can it 
be contended that Wall was only making representations 
about the Motel's value as of some previous elate. EYe11 
if Wall had not specifically represented, as he did, that 
the $300,000.00 Yaluation was justified by current income, 
appellants could have relied on the implication that Wall 
knew nothing incompatible with that valuation. The Re-
statement, Section 539, states the legal proposition: "A 
Rtatement of opinion in a business transaction upon facts 
not disclosed or otherwise known to the recipient may 
reasonably be interpreted as an implied statement that 
the maker knows of no fact incompatible with his 
opinion.'' 
This record compels confirmation of appellants' de-
fault judgment against Wall as against Wall and any-
one claiming an equitable interest under him. The trial 
court's findings arnl conclusions to the contrary are the 
grossest error. There is serious question (particularly 
in vieY1' of Fidelity's notice of the Gibbs-Wall fraud ac-
tion) that responclelltR can look behind the default in any 
event. r:l'he law favors the conclusiveness of juclg;ments 
as against the partieR arnl their privies. A typical state•-
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ment of the <loctrine is this statement from American 
.Turi sprudence: 
''The general rules as to the conclusiveness 
of judgments apply to a judgment by def a ult 
which is ordinarily just as conclusive an adjudi~ 
cation between the parties and privies as one ren-
dered after an answer and contest. Thus, the fact 
that a judgment is rendered by default has been 
held not to prevent it from operating as a basis 
for the application of the doctrine of res judicata. 
When properly rendered, such a judgment has 
been regarded as conclusive and binding between 
the parties and privies as to matters properly al-
leged in the complaint or petition in the former 
proceeding and necessarily involved and passed 
upon." (30 Am. Jur., Judgments, Sec. 226.) 
POINT III 
WITHOUT REFERENCE TO WALL'S 
FRAUD OR THE JUDGMENT APPELLANTS 
OBTAINED BASED UPON IT, APPELLANTS 
ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE THE TRACT'S 
TITLE QUIETED IN THEM BECAUSE THE 
SALESCONTRACTHASNEVERBEENPE~ 
FORMED BY THE BUYER. 
This is essentially a quiet title action. Appellants 
unquestionably held fee title to the Tract in 1962. They 
entered into a contract for its sale on September 5, 1962. 
Under that contract, the buyer was entitled to convey-
ance when he ( 1) transferred to appellants acceptable 
Pxchange properties valued by Zions Savings Bank at 
$18~~,000.00, or (2) paid the purchase price in money or 
both money and exchange properties, or (3) deposited 
with the trustee securities having a value 21h times the 
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value of n11:v m1paicl balance of the purchase pnce. 
(Exh. n.) 
No one contends that the purchase price has been 
paid. Appellants may not lawfully be compelled to con-
vey, therefon•, unless the sales contract has been per-
forme<l by the buyer i11 the deposit of security. 
There is evidence that property, the Puehlo 1\Iotel, 
was convt>yed to the trustee as security for something. 
The property sn "deposited" (lid not, hmYev0r, have a 
vahw 21,~ times the $63,000.00 unpaid balance. It had 
no value. That appellants or respondents or both ma:· 
have been temporaril:· deceiYecl <loes not alter the basic 
fact of non-1wrformance by \Vall or by any assignee of 
\Vall. 
On this record, there can he no valid findi11g of p0r-
formanec· or substantial performance by Vv all. If this 
is Fidelity's theory, it has utterly failed in its proof. 
Even if appellants' judgment against \Vall were set 
aside, Ficlelit:· would he obliged to pay $63,000.00 to lw-
come e11tit1e<l to a deed under the Exhibit 6 contract. 
POINT IV 
rr1n: ~~VIDENCl~ DOES NOT REVEAL A SIT-
UATION WHERE THE DOCTRINE OF ES-
TOPPEL CAN BE INVOKED AGAINST AP-
PJ<:LT ,ANT8. 
A fW<'Olld thNJry 011 which Fidclit:· may hav0 pro-
ceeded in this case is that appellants represente<l to Fi· 
<frlity that vVall had performed his contract under such 
c-irrumstances that appellants may not now deny that 
performance. 
\Ve have already commented on the nature of the 
communications between Gibbs and Kump. In total, they 
do not amount to a representation that Wall had suf-
iiciently performed to be entitled to a deed. Against the 
ha('kground of the transactions then in contemplation, it 
appears that Gibbs was only indicating the deposited 
security was sufficient to justify the mortgage which was 
in fact consummated. Even Fidelity does not appear to 
have construed the Gibbs message as a representation 
that ·wan was now entitled to a deed from the trustee. If 
FidPlity had so construed the message, it would certainly 
havr demanded conveyance from Security, because Fi-
c1elity then had Wall's deed to the Tract. 
Even if the Gibbs' communications had been un-
equivocal, however, we do not have an estoppel situation. 
Tlw most quoted definition of estoppel (see Public Utili-
ties Connn. v. Jones, 54 U 111, 179 Pac. 745) is set out in 
the American Jurisprudence discussion at 28 Am. J ur. 
2nd 628: 
"It is the principle by which a party who knows 
or should know the truth is absolutely precluded 
from denying any material fact which he has, 
hy words or conduct, induced another, who was 
e~cusably ignorant of the true facts and who had 
a right to rely upon such words or conduct, to be-
lie\'e and act upon them, thereby, as a consequence 
reasonably to be anticipated, changing his position 
in such a way that he would suffer injury if such 
denial were allowed.'' 
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This is a somP\Yliat innllntP statement, hnt it points up 
the distinct similarity between the elements of cstoppel 
and fraud. It must be true, inter alia, that the party 
against ·whom the doctrine is i11voked (1) lrnew the true 
facts, ( 2) i11dueed the i11voking party to believe otlwr-
wise and (3) was in such relationship to the invoking 
party tlrnt the invoking party had a right to rely on what-
ever the estopped party said. 
In the instant ease, it rloes not appear that appel-
lants cn•r said anything to Fidelity except that the <lea] 
with \Vall was "almost" closed. This is not the kind 
of representation which will support an estoppel. Quot-
ing American Jurisprudence again (HI Am . .Jnr., Esbp-
pel, Section 52): "The truthful statement as to the pres-
ent intention of a party with regard to his future acts is 
not the foundation on which an cstoppel may be built." 
A more definitive assurance from Gibbs is produced by 
Fidelity only i11 tlw form of <t note left for 1\fr. Kump hy 
his secretary. The message on the note is not shO"wn to 
be a quote; it is cryptic and the rankest hearsay. Appel-
lants were not permitted to examine the writer of the 
note. Such notes arc, we find, admissahle "under the 
shop hook rule." The langi.rnge of the note does not sug-
gest, however, Gibbs' willingness to permit any differ-
ent alienation of the Tract than actually occurred. 
Even if the Gibbs communications were exactly as 
Fidelity representR them, however, it does not appear 
that appellants knowingly misinformed Fidelity. In-
deed, as soon as they became aware of the falsity of their 
information, they brought appropriate action and gave 
notice to Fidelity. 
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ft does not appear that appellants undertook to in-
dncP Fidelity to do anything or that they stood to gain 
by Fidelity's transaction with Wall. Fidelity continually 
importuned Gibbs even though it had no right to demand 
information from him. There was absolutely no con-
tractual or business relationship between them. If this 
was inducement as between Gibbs and Fidelity, Fidelity 
was the inducer. 
Finally, there is no showing that Fidelity changed 
its position for the worse in reliance on anything Gibbs 
said. Any payments Fidelity made are either now re-
eovera ble or (as in the case of the South Davis Water 
District demand) satisfied an already existing obligation. 
l n short. this is not a situation where the ends of 
justice demand that appellants be estopped to deny that 
Wall performed his contract. Appellants haven't lied; 
tlwy are the victims of lies. They did not "induce" Fi-
delity; they were solicited by Fidelity. They owed no 
duty to Fidelity, but their responses to Fidelity's ques-
tions were as accurate as their information would per-
mit. "The doctrine of estoppel should be applied cau-
tiously and only when equity requires it to be done. In 
determining the application of the doctrine, the counter-
equities of the parties are entitled to due consideration." 
(28 Am. Jur. 2nd 631.) Appellants stand to lose 
$65,000.00 by reason of Wall's deceit if they are estopped. 
Otherwise, Fidelity merely recovers from escrow the con-
sideration previously paid. 
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POINT V 
FIDELI'11Y rs NOT A BONA FIDE PUR-
CHASER. 
Fidelit~r cannot claim to have acquired legal title to 
the Traet by any deed heretofore received by it. It has 
deeds from ·wall, who lrn<l the equita blc title of a pur-
chaser, and B. & .J. InvestmentR Co., which had the equi-
table title of a mortgagee. rrhe second deed was execntrcl 
after Fidelity lrnd notice of appellant's suit against ·wall. 
Fidelit~r is, in fact, simply a purchaser from a buyer ·who 
had not obtained legal title at the time of his resale and 
who defaulted on the basic contract. This is a familiar 
situation in the law. The second buyer, eYen if he has 
paid full consideration, bas consistently been denied, the 
status of bona fide purchaser. In determining whethrr 
a purchaser is "bona fide'', tlie courts first look to the 
nature of his titlr. There is no such thing as a bona ficlr 
pnrdiaser ·without legal title. This is a general principlr 
of the law of sales whether the property is reill or per-
sonal. In their treatise' on Sales, the editors of Cor7ms 
Juris 8cn1wl11111 sa~r (77 C . .T.S. 1085): 
"In ordrr for a transartion to entitle a person to 
claim protection as a hona fide purchaser, there 
must lw a completPd cleliYery of the property to 
tlw purchaser as owner .... It is necessary in 
onler to he :1 bona fide purchaser that the interest 
acquired l>r a legal title, and the good faith acqui-
sition of a merely cquita ble title or interest does 
not suffice for this purpose. 
and, wi.th speeific rc'frrencc to realty, A mcrican Jurispru-
d rm cc ( 55 Am . .Tur., Vend or & Purr has er, Sec. 7 66) says 
this: 
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''The protection afforded a bona fide purchaser 
of real estate extends, as a general rule, only to 
persons purchasing and acquiring the legal title, 
and not to the purchaser of an equitable interest; 
and since the interest of a purchaser of real estate 
before a conveyance is a mere equitable interest, 
it is regarded as insufficient to afford the pur-
chaser protection against an earlier equal equity." 
Section 172 ( d) of the Restatement of Restitution 
contemplates almost exactly the instant fact situation: 
''Thus, if a transfer of land is procured by fraud, 
and the fraudulent transferee ... contracts to sell 
the land to another, the other is not a bona fide 
purchaser since the title to the property has not 
been transferred to him, and his equitable claim 
is subject to the prior equitable claim of the de-
frauded person, even though the other pays value 
without notice of the fraud." 
aml his general doctrine has been adoted by virtually 
Pvery court 'vhich has considered the problem. (See 
Sequin v. Maloney, 198 Ore. 272, 253 P. 2d 252, 35 A.L.R. 
2d 1412). 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants 8L~ek to quiet title to land they once 
agreed to sell for a purchase price they have never re-
ceived. Respondents are people who dealt with appel-
lants' buyer and acquired equitable interests in the 
land. Each of the parties has taken some action in re-
liance on -wall's misrepresentations. We submit, how-
ever, that appellants, as defrauded sellers, must prevail 
against the claims of purchasers of equitable interests 
from appellants' fraudulent buyer. 
'l'he trial court, forming prejudices beyond compre-
hension, made finding-8 against the evidence and adopted 
conclusions inconsistent with its findings. It supports 
tlw findings by unreasonably exercising a discretion not 
to believe witness<>s and, presumably, by assuming that 
to disbeliev<> a \vitness establishes the opposite of what 
he has said. 
We cite as error and as evidence of improper trial 
the characterization of appellants' witnesses, including 
two members of the har, as nearly perjurous, when 
their testimony was not even impeached. We submit 
that the decision of the trial court ignores the evidence 
and offends the law. 
Reespectfully submitted, 
FRANK .J. ALLEN, 
:i51 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellants 
28 
